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LAW AND JUSTICE.
BY DR. C. A. F. LINDORME.
IMAGINING a deputation for the people petitioning the legis-
lature for a reformation of the law, one might suppose the spokes-
man of the deputation to address the speaker of the legislature as
follows
:
"Mr. Speaker, it is not vanity if we declare this presence a
remarkable historical moment. When, on former occasions, depu-
tations for the people came for a hearing, the object was some
special legislation. What the people petition for now is a reforma-
tion of the whole plan of the law. For thousands of years the law
has been considered the wand, not to say the rod, of civilization,
and what has been the upshot, morally, socially ? We have not only
more actual crime, comparatively, than ever before, but a general
laxity of morals, which, in the very face of the startling figures of
the criminal statistics, observes a dull indiiTerence and shameless
frivolity, on taking notice of the grim fact of the growing corrup-
tion.
"Two thousand years ago the Roman lawyers were in a quand-
ary whether justice was the outcome of the law. or whether the law
was the outcome of justice.
"They never could settle the question.
"How about our lawyers?
"They are in the same quandary, so much so, indeed, that they
do not even try any more to get at one about it.
"There is a deluge of legislation. One law follows on the neck
of another, and none gives satisfaction. Yet the mad hope is enter-
tained to reach by forcible law-fight the perfection of peaceable so-
ciety.
"It is an old dream dreamt over again by each new generation.
All and everything along the line of forensic practice is moving in
interminable barrenness of tradition. From the day that the law-
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authority made itself practically the master of the situation, juris-
prudence established theoretically an abstraction-in-and-in-breeding
which precluded all fresh blood from other fields; jurisprudence
supplied its thought exclusively from its own thinking, and keeps
on doing so, all the momentous discoveries in nature notwithstand-
ing. When jurisprudence laid the foundation, theoretically, of legal
argument, there was no science of bodily man, no physiology, and
what there was of psychology, was the outcome of uncertain ex-
perience by vague and vain introspection. There is a science of man
now, and the willing scholar can find the points of connection be-
tween physiology and psychology. But jurisprudence travels on
with the old theoretical running gear, and acknowledges man only
as a nominal unit, an individual made first by the law, by virtue of
the name given him.
"Is it then not wrong to rely on the law for the right? How
can a law be acceptable which afifords such miserable results, prac-
tically?"
Speaker. "Have you a remedy to propose? We must have law."
Spokesman. "Not of the kind we have inherited from our
forebears. The trouble with the jurisprudence of the traditional
in-and-in-breeding of wild abstraction, which makes it entirely unfit
for an ethical support of civic life, is the circumstance, that the
forensic practice brings the law into closer touch with the wrong
than with the right ; the law which we have inherited from our
foregoers is a law the right of which has not the run of the public
mind ; it does not go before, but lies in ambush, waiting for the
wrong to be done, first ; then the right bounces on it in fiendish spite,
and punishes the wrong for being there, and this is by everybody
praised as an avenging of the wrong, although nobody knows what
this avenging at the bottom of the business is."
Speaker. "How can you mend it? I repeat, there must be
law."
Spokesm. "We can mend it by making the law an institution
to promote the positive good, before the wrong steals a march upon
the right. Why can the principle of love not extend into the sphere
of the law? v^'liy can the law not be friendly to the germs of well-
doing in the people? why must it be a vocation to punish and to
avenge the wrong only, when it comes, never mind the straggling
right, before it is caught in the meshes of the snares of illegality?
"And the worst is, there is a perfect gluttony of false ethics in
the law. The spirit of revenge is what one might call demoniacal,
as if there was something intrinsically blissful in the punishment;
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as if the illegal outrage were atoned for by the outrage being done
over again, legally.
"There is no feeling of love in juridical actuation, let alone
love of feeling; all the move in this direction is in the admonition,
'mind, you be good, else you will see how bad I can be.'
"The physicians have preventive medicine. Why can the law-
yers not have preventive jurisprudence?
"Here is an illustration. In public parks, in some countries,
the happy practice has been established of distributing placards bear-
ing the inscription, 'the grounds are recommended to the protection
of the visitors.'
"The grounds are perfectly safe. More particularly they are
safer than they used to be under the old regime, 'trespassers will
be prosecuted with the utmost rigor of the law, smoked first, hanged
next, and finally torn to pieces.'
"Why?
"The rowdies feel honored by being trusted to act as their own
police ; it raises their fraternity to a flattering level ; and conse-
quently they refrain from disgracing themselves by vandalism.
Love of honesty, and honesty of love, is so thoroughly ingrained in
man, and so paramount in the civic order, that gangs of scoundrels
even can not dispense with it ; they cultivate it and wish it to
flourish in their midst, lest their fellowships crumble.
"The judiciary, if they indulge in the proud ambition to be an
ethical agency, are laboring under a huge mistake : The law, by its
nature, is forbidding" only, and consequently merely negative. It
can not do anything towards the promotion of positive good. This
is a result of its organization. The ethical standard of the judiciary
of to-day is as low as that of the heathen Romans ; it is intellectual-
ized in the slogan, 'all that is not forbidden is allowed.' It is an
unavoidable outcome of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence,
but disowns the law as an agency of ethics ; it discourages the good
actions of the better-intentioned, and provokes the bad actions of
the low-minded. The law, by referring only to the negative of the
wrong, never to the positive of the good, eliminates from civic life
all tendency of spontaneous well-doing, and so the otherwise enig-
matic fact is explained, why old peoples, with the most masterly
law-system, can, and have been morally depraved, while youthful
tribes, with hardly any law at all, were models of righteousness and
virtue.
"An amusing anecdote bearing upon this theme, is told of a Ger-
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man university. The curfew had previously rung at eleven o'clock.
For some reason or other the time was extended to midnight.
"After some weeks of the new observance a privatim docens,
who took theoretically an interest in the change, meeting one of the
fast boys, asked him how they liked the extension.
"
'It is not liked at all,' he answered.
" 'How is that?' the private teacher asked in surprise.
"
'O, you see,' the student answered, 'the beer-clubs must now
drink till twelve, and that is decidedly too long.'
"Now, there was no must, to guzzle their throats with beer,
either before or after. By the new ordinance the tapsters were
only at liberty to keep open till midnight. But there is a sort of
false conclusiveness in the public at large, which induces them to
coast an infringement of the law as close as they can get it, just
because transgression is forbidden.
"Hence the absurdity of the syllogism of the anarchists, 'Abolish
the law, and there will be no infringement.'
"But the empiricism must be admitted, for all that, the more
law, and the closer the law, the less spontaneous virtue."
Speaker. "Let us hear how you want to mend it. I repeat,
there must be law."
Spokesm. "If there must be law, then let it be. But do not hope
for good results in its present hypocritical organization. There is
no genuine morality in the right of the law. The judge exhorts
the witness to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and all the truth,
and the perjured witness is severely punished. But the parties and
their counsel are not ruled by such abstraction-fastidiousness. They
are not guided by any moral principle at all. The .juridical literature
boasts of the publicity of the law-procedure as a safe-guard of
honest prosecution. It is an empty boast, a sham publicity. There
is at the outset of a law-fight a secret conspiracy of each of the
contending parties with their legal accomplices against the judge,
and this wrong is considered their right.
"Why is that so?
"There is no honest philosophical justification of such impunity
of mendaciousness. The forensic usage is mere tradition. It dates
from despotic times, when the judge was a creature of the men in
power, and the defendant had to be protected against hateful per-
secution.
"The usage is without all sense in fair popular courts of law.
"It is a fundamental maxim of the judiciary to listen in a
law'Case to both sides of the question. But the parties' counsel is
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allowed to ignore the rule. All the interest of the attorney-at-law
is that of the iniquity of the parties and their own. As in the old
ordeal their concern is in their fight alone : where formerly skulls
were smashed, and limbs crushed, now brains are broken, and sen-
tences corrupted.
"Can the truth in the judge not be reached save by the lies of
the attorneys? Can honesty in the arbiter not be attained save by
the tricks of the advocates?
"The greatest turpitude in a judge is to accept presents from
a party that is to appear in his court. It is considered bribery, and
a judge who makes himself guilty of it will be impeached. But the
counsel lives on bribes, and the appetite for them has become so
voracious that they rob what they can not get in a more polite man-
ner.
"It is the attorney's way of making a living.
"Why is this so?
"Why at all this separatism between bar and bench? Can the
right not be made out except by the wrong first having a fight
over it?
"Does this fight not presuppose that there is something foul in
the forensic usage, a right which is wrong?
"I do not want to enter theoretically upon the question, whether
the law makes justice, or justice law. But thus much I maintain
practically: justice supersedes the lazv: justice is not a matter of
deep intellectualizing, but one of the good will of the parties. Noth-
ing easier in the world than to do justice, if the parties only want
to do it. There was never a party going to law, except for lack of
justice. Is it then not damnable statesmanship to observe a system
which makes it possible for shrewd individuals to make the law
trickery a trade?
"The law, as it is, is a pretext ; it is the stalking horse of abuse.
Abolish therefore a fraternity whose ofiice it is to foment this abuse.
It is wrong to have three rights, one of the plaintifl^, one of the
defendant, and one of the judge. The right is no private afifair at
all; it is a public concern, the concern of the civic order: When
parties can not get along peaceably in mutual harmony, and go to
law, to have their peace made by the authority instituted, they for-
feit their independence ; it is furthermore the mission of the personi-
fication of the public, to make their peace, and consequently there
is one point of view only for those officially responsible, from which
to consider the matter, and deal with it to the^ best of the general
interest. Judge and jury, and counsel, must be therefore hitched
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abreast, the counsels being, like the judge, compensated by a salary
which makes them independent from their clients, and given the
direction to consider it their duty to compromise cases, not foment
quarrels by holding out the hope for a successful fight at the cost
of 'the other fellow.'
"Make the law friendly to the good citizen, gratis to him who
is willing to do justice to his adversary, costly to the caviler who
wants to appeal, and bring the right in closer touch with the good
than the bad, by ceasing to lie in wait for the wrong before attention
is given to the right. If, for instance, we had houses of education
for the children who receive no education at home, or have no home,
fewer would grow up to be jailbirds who are a blot upon our civili-
zation and must be housed by the State in penitentiaries at greater
expense than would be incurred by suitable houses of education for
the children.
"If- our law-system was doing anything towards a betterment
of society ; if it had done any thing of the kind heretofore, it would
be perceptible.
"It is not. If you want to get aware of the kind of morality
which is fomented by the law, take up a newspaper and count the
columns occupied by reports of crimes, wrecks, murders, and broad
sensational dwelling upon the topic.
"Is it not time, then, to employ nobler means of culture and
progress ?
"I have finished."
Speaker. "I appreciate highly your interestingly bold exposi-
tion. If the conservative will hesitate to accept the total plan, it
commends itself through its tendency to all lovers of good public
order and felicity."
